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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Symposium issue celebrating his career, Professor Michael
Risinger in Leveraging Surprise proposes using "the fundamental emotion
of surprise" as a way of measuring belief for purposes of legal proof.1 More
specifically, Professor Risinger argues that we should not conceive of the
burden of proof in terms of probabilities such as 51%, 95%, or even "beyond
a reasonable doubt." 2 Rather, the legal system should reference the threshold
using "words of estimative surprise" 3 -asking jurors how surprised they
would be if the fact in question were not true. Toward this goal (and being
averse to cardinality), he suggests categories such as "mildly surprised,
surprised, quite surprised, greatly surprised, astonished, shocked, etc." 4
We find Professor Risinger's proposal intriguing. After all, one can
imagine important theoretical reasons why surprise might generate different
results from probability. To the extent that the surprise formulation is
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Christian J. Moran, United States Court of Federal Claims,
Office of Special Masters.
** FedEx Research Professor (2017-18) and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School.
Thanks to Dale Nance for helpful comments, as well as Michael Risinger and participants at
the Symposium on Experts, Inference and Innocence at Seton Hall Law School in October
2017. All recruitment and experimental procedures were approved by the Vanderbilt
Institutional Review Board (IRB # 081408).
D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply that We
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REv. 965
(2018).
2 David H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden ofPersuasion: What Bayesian Decision Rules
Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1 (1999).
Risinger, supra note 1.
4 Risinger, supra note 1.
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unfamiliar, it might cause jurors to think holistically ("System 1") as opposed
to attempting to use rules (often misremembered or misapplied) about
probability ("System 2"). Surprise might be easier to approach
qualitatively, unlike probability, which cries out for quantitative calculation
and invokes the fear of numbers for some. Surprise is also notably framed
in the negative ("How surprised would you be if the fact were not true?")
compared to its probability counterpart ("What is the probability that the fact
is true?").
Being empiricists, we thus could not help but put Professor Risinger's
worthy proposal to the test, if only in a preliminary way. Just what might
conceptualizing evidence under a framework of "surprise" look like and get
us in practice? Here, we report on a simple experiment where potential jurors
were recruited to evaluate evidence using both a surprise framework and a
framework using probabilistic language. Using the experiment, we set out
to answer two questions: First, does using degrees of "surprise" actually
produce intelligible and consistent results among laypersons? And second,
does using degrees of "surprise" to evaluate evidence produce results that
provide a material benefit, either empirically or normatively, when compared
to frameworks based on probability?
II. DESIGN AND METHODS
For our study, we used an online platform, which allowed us to recruit
a large sample of individuals to evaluate scenarios under both the proposed
surprise and the traditional probability frameworks. Because it was likely
that the differences between probabilistic and surprise-based evidence
evaluation interact with the weight of the evidence, we wrote scenarios
where the weight of the evidence could be set to different levels.
To ensure that the subjects' responses were not influenced by their
answers to other questions, we used a between-subjects experimental design:
Each subject evaluated only a single scenario and provided a response using
either a probabilistic or a surprise framework, but not both.
Seven scenarios were written for the purpose of this study. Each
involved the same basic fact pattern in which "Bob" was charged with the
murder of his co-worker and friend "James." However, the scenarios varied
with regard to the weight of the evidence against "Bob." The scenarios were
written so as to impress upon the reader different levels of culpability,
ranging from virtually certain innocence ("Evidence Level 1") to virtually
certain guilt ("Evidence Level 7"). The seven scenarios are reproduced in
Table A below.
5 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) for a comprehensive
discussion of this dual-process framework of human psychology.
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TABLE A: THE SCENARIOS
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Scenario
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James. A security camera
shows both of them leaving a sporting event
together shortly before James's death. Bob denied
Evidence the charges from the beginning, reporting that they
Level 1 had gone their separate ways soon after. The
murder weapon, a bloody knife, was found stuck
in James's body. DNA testing determined that the
blood on the knife was a mixture of James and
another male, but was not a match to Bob.
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James. James was found dead
of a gunshot wound in his office and investigators
received an anonymous call reporting that Bob
Evidence and James had recently been feuding. Police
Level 2 found a gun in Bob's car, but later determined that
Bob had a permit to carry the gun, and the bullet
that killed James was not fired from it.
Nonetheless, witnesses can corroborate that Bob
and James had been feuding.
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James. James was found
strangled to death in his own home. Bob is the last
Evidence person known to have visited James the night
Level 3 before James was murdered. There was no
physical evidence found at the scene of the crime
and neighbors reported not hearing any noise or
activity in James' house after Bob left.
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
Evidence worker and friend, James. A witness reports that
Level 4 Bob and James had a loud argument at a local bar
close in time to James's approximate time of
death.
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James. James was last seen
Evidence accompanying Bob on a camping trip. Bob
Level 5 reports that the trip was uneventful and that at the
end of the trip James drove home. However, no
trace of James or his vehicle has ever been found.
2018]
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Bob has faced some recent financial troubles, and
had disagreed with James on whether to sell a
jointly owned apartment building. Upon James's
death, Bob became the sole owner of the
apartment building.
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James. A witness reports that
on the night of the murder, Bob and James had a
Evidence loud argument at a local bar over an affair that
Level 6 James had been having with Bob's wife. Another
witness states that she heard the sound of gunshots
minutes after the time a 911 call reporting the fight
was placed.
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James. A witness reports that
on the night of the murder, Bob and James had a
Evidence loud argument at a local bar over an affair that
Level 7 James had been having with Bob's wife. Video
surveillance outside the bar shows Bob shooting
James. Bob was apprehended fleeing from the
scene by an off-duty officer, who found the
murder weapon in Bob's waistband.
After evaluating the scenario, subjects were asked two independent
questions. First, subjects were asked to provide a numerical evaluation of
the strength of the evidence. This first question was framed either in terms
of the subjects' estimated probability or the subjects' experience of surprise.
Because probability and surprise can pertain to both the defendant's guilt and
innocence, we framed the question both ways for each. This resulted in four
possible questions that the subject could be asked to evaluate. Which
question was presented to any given subject was determined randomly. The
four possible questions are presented in Table B.
TABLE B: THE MEASURES
Measure<, Prompt
Based on what is known, what do you believe is
p(Guilty) the probability (expressed as a percentage) that
Bob murdered James?
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Based on what is known, what do you believe is
p(Not Guilty) the probability (expressed as a percentage) that
Bob DID NOT murder James?
.u Based on what is known, how surprised would
you be to find out that Bob murdered James?
Based on what is known, how surprised would
surprise(Not you be to find out that Bob DID NOT murder
James?
Subjects provided the response to this numerical question on a 101-
point Likert scale. We understand that Professor Risinger's proposal
expressed a desire to eliminate all "unwarranted cardinality" from
representations of evidence,6 and thus use of this numerical Likert scale may
be inconsistent with his vision. For the purposes of this study, however, we
wanted to be able to make meaningful comparisons between the probability
framework and the surprise framework. We therefore used the 0-100 scale
as a matter of convenience. Future research may want to consider different
approaches. For example, one might transform Professor Risinger's
categories (e.g., moderately surprised, astonished, shocked, etc.) into a
numerical space for comparison purposes, though the specifics of such a
transform would likely be subjective and contested.
Second, all subjects were asked to make a legal determination of guilt
on the basis of the scenario. Specifically, subjects were asked: "Based on
what is known, do you think that Bob is guilty of murder?" We included this
question so that we could evaluate how the subjects' evaluation of the
evidence-under either the probabilistic or the surprise framework-related
to their legal determinations.
In total, we recruited 593 individuals to participate in this study in
October 2017. All recruitment and experimental procedures were approved
by the Vanderbilt Institutional Review Board. For recruiting subjects, we
used Amazon's Mechanical Turk service (AMT). AMT is an online
marketplace where individuals across the globe can perform various tasks
for payment from various providers. Such web-based recruiting techniques
have been widely validated (that is, online subjects have been demonstrated
6 Risinger, supra note 1.
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to display similar behavior to subjects recruited using conventional means),
and the resulting population samples are substantially more representative
than the convenience samples (e.g., of college students) typically used in
such studies.7 There is, of course, always the possibility that remote subjects
may not be fully attentive to the task at hand. To account for this, we
excluded subjects who took an abnormal amount of time to respond.8
Further, we only used subjects who had an established history of
satisfactorily completing tasks on AMT. Ultimately, 469 subjects were
included in the final analysis.9
Subjects who agreed to participate were directed through AMT to the
actual experiment, which was hosted by Qualtrics. Qualtrics is a web-based
platform that is regularly used by scholars in many fields for hosting surveys
and experiments. At the conclusion of their participation, subjects were
debriefed and paid at an approximate rate of $6 per hour.
Before participating, Amazon confirmed that all potential participants
were over the age of 18 and were United States (US) citizens or residents by
means of a US-based bank account as well as their IP address. All
experiments ended with subjects providing some demographic information,
which allowed us to confirm that the sample was generally representative of
the US jury-eligible population (57% male with a median age of 33).
III. RESULTS
Figure 1 displays the responses provided by subjects for each of the
four prompts and each evidence level, along with the median (in green).
Figure 1 allows us to compare how subjects estimate evidentiary strength
under a surprise framework and a probability framework. The figures,
however, do not tell us if one of the frameworks is doing a better job than
7 See, e.g., Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon's
Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. Sci. 3 (2011); Jon Sprouse, A Validation of Amazon Mechanical Turk for the
Collection of Acceptability Judgments in Linguistic Theory, 43 BEHAv. RES. METHODS 155
(2011).
8 Subjects whose timing was two standard deviations faster or slower than the average
participant were excluded. This is a customary screening technique to detect non-compliance
with task instructions.
9 A pilot version of this study was run in August 2017. That version was largely similar
in design to the version of the study presented here except that the scenarios in the pilot
version were scaled from equipoise of guilt to a high probability of guilt; no scenario
contained evidence of innocence. In addition to this, we used different scenario facts and the
questions were framed to subjects differently. Subjects that completed the pilot version of
this study were blocked from participating in the final version of the study. The design
implemented here was changed from the pilot version of the study as a result of feedback
provided by colleagues who reviewed the manuscript prior to the Symposium, and we thank
them for their suggestions. The major findings observed here were also observed in the pilot
study.
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the other. To further evaluate this question, we can compare the estimates
with how likely subjects were (considered in aggregate) to find guilt on the
basis of the evidence. We derived this likelihood measure from the subjects'
response to the first question (i.e., "Based on what is known, do you think
that Bob is guilty of murder?"). Importantly, every subject answered this
question, and it was answered prior to the response to the second question.
As a result, we can collapse all responses across the surprise and probability
conditions. Figure 2 adds an additional line (in red) representing the
proportion of subjects finding the defendant guilty (or not guilty) on the basis
of the evidence.
FIGURE 1: MEAN EVIDENCE STRENGTH UNDER SURPRISE AND
PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORKS
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FIGURE 2: MEDIAN EVIDENCE STRENGTH UNDER SURPRISE AND
PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORKS COMPARED TO GUILT DETERMINATIONS
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Figure 2 suggests that the median of the surprise(Not Guilty) metric tracks
the actual conviction rate as well as, if not better than, the median of the
p(Guilty) metric. The inverse metrics p(Not Guilty) and surprise (Guilty)
tracked the actual acquittal rate less well,10 though the way in which they
deviated differed.
1o To formally assess "how well" the estimations tracked the guilt determinations, we
performed a correlation analysis between subjects' estimations and their decisions of guilt for
each of the metrics. This analysis allows us to calculate the strength of the relationship
between the two responses. The r2 values were as follows: p(Guilty), 0.63; p(Not Guilty),
0.25; surprise(Guilty), 0.32; surprise(Not Guilty), 0.52. All of the metrics showed significant
correlations (ps < 0.05). However, the strength of the correlations for p(Guilty) and
surprise(Not Guilty) were significantly higher than for the other two metrics (Zs > 2.09; ps <
0.05).
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Another way of assessing metrics is to evaluate their internal coherence.
For example, p (Guilty) and p(Not Guilty) should be complements, as should
surprise(Guilty) and surprise(Not Guilty). Figure 3 plots the two probability
metrics together, and the two innocence metrics together. Theoretically, the
curves of the median estimates should form an "X," which is the case for the
surprise metrics. The probability metrics, however, do not, as the p(Not
Guilty) curve exhibits some flattening for non-extreme evidence levels.
FIGURE 3: EXAMINATION OF INTERNAL COHERENCE
Probability Measures Surprise Measures
4
One final possibility for assessing the four metrics is to consider
their level of dispersion. Even if we cannot agree on a "ground truth" by
which to evaluate the accuracy of the metrics, we might agree that getting a
tight distribution of estimates from participants is preferable. To examine
how consistent subjects are when making probability or surprise evaluations
of evidence, we looked at the results in the following way: We first
centered" the data for each probe and evidence level. After centering, the
data from each evidence level for a given prompt was combined. Figure 4
plots the histograms of the deviations from the mean for each metric. Visual
examination suggests that the spreads are all similar. A statistical analysis
indicates that the variance in subjects' responses for p(Guilty), p(Not
Guilty), and surprise(Not Guilty) were statistically similar. 12 Subjects'
1 To center means to subtract the mean of the set from each item in the set. This
transformation normalizes for mean, but not for variance. To normalize for both the mean
and variance is called a z-transformation.
12 Brown-Forsythe Test: F(2,348) = 0.35, p = 0.701.
1090 SE TON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1081
variance in their responses for surprise(Guilty), however, were greater than
the other three.' 3
FIGURE 4: BOXPLOTS OF DEVIATION FROM MEDIAN
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IV. DISCUSSION
This exploratory study is meant to be nothing more than prefatory.
We hope that it can begin a conversation and provide a starting point for
future, more comprehensive studies. Concordantly, we caution the reader to
be especially guarded when making conclusions. With those caveats in
mind, there are several aspects to the results that excite us for what they may
ultimately reveal.
As an initial matter, surprise appears to be a viable metric. This
outcome is interesting if for no other reason than the fact that surprise is an
unusual way of conceptualizing the strength of evidence. In our experience,
individuals are quite familiar with estimating their confidences using a
probabilistic framework. By contrast, expressing confidence in a conclusion
by indicating a high level of hypothetical surprise over the opposite outcome
is a procedure few are familiar with. Nonetheless, this study shows that
surprise measures are highly consistent across subjects. In fact, when we
compare the amount of variance that subjects display when making
responses using a surprise framework we find that it is no different from the
variance in responses using a probabilistic framework. In other words,
subjects appear to be equally consistent when gauging the strength of
evidence using surprise as they are with probabilities.
This finding on consistency partially mitigates Professor Risinger's
concern that there may be "significant variability" between individuals when
making assessments based on surprise.' 4 To be sure, his concern was that
individuals might value word-based strength categories differently. What
we have shown here, however, is that at least with respect to numerical
presentations, potential jurors seem to share a common "surprise scale," or
at least one no worse than for numerical probabilities. An insistence on
word-based strength categories may generate additional problems, but at
least there is nothing inherent about the concept of surprise that promotes
greater inconsistency among subjects.
One possible explanation for the similar variability between the
probability and surprise metrics is that subjects are using a similar mental
calculus to determine their response. For example, perhaps all subjects
basically think in terms of probabilities, whether asked about probability
explicitly or asked about level of surprise. This explanation, however, is
undercut by the data in Figure 1. While it is true that subjects evaluate
evidence similarly (if not identically) under a p(Guilty) and a surprise(Not
Guilty) framework, that is not true for the converse measures: p(Not Guilty)
and surprise(Guilty). The divergence between p(Not Guilty) and
surprise(Guilty), which we might reasonably expect to also track each other
1-to-1, is remarkable. For example, at Evidence Levels 4-6, a typical subject
14 Risinger, supra note 1.
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reports a probability of innocence of about 50% while a typical subject
reports surprise at the defendant's guilt to be about 20 out of 100. As the
amount of inculpatory evidence increases, this gap narrows somewhat, but
remains substantial until Evidence Level 7.
Why the lack of correspondence between the measures of p(Not
Guilty) and surprise(Guilty) given the high level of correspondence between
p(Guilty) and surprise(Not Guilty)? Our current data reveals no answers.
Future studies may want to consider debriefing subjects to understand their
thought process when making the determinations. Future studies may also
try to design an experiment that associates this divergence with a known
psychological phenomenon.
Where should others go from here? To begin, there is no better
statistical measure of the robustness of a result than replication.15 Though
not presented here beyond a footnote, we think it is important to note that the
results presented here served as a replication of a pilot study, finding
substantially the same results. That said, we hope that others will try to
replicate these results in other contexts. For example, do the results hold if
mock jurors are instructed using pattern jury instructions (or their corollary)
rather than using a simple rating scale? What happens if the quantitative
scales are replaced by word categories as Professor Risinger proposed?
What happens if the vignettes become more factually complex, or draw from
the civil context, or involve potential biasing mechanisms like race or
gender?
A final possibility is to push further on the thought that surprise
encourages a more holistic or System 2 approach to the problem of evidence.
Along these lines, one question is whether surprise might protect against
common probabilistic fallacies. One of the most ubiquitous probabilistic
fallacies in legal contexts is the base rate fallacy. This fallacy concerns the
little weight subjects give to base rates when computing likelihood. To
formally test whether using measures of surprise might ameliorate the effects
of this fallacy in decision-making, we presented 357 subjects 1 6 with a variant
of Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky's classic hypothetical involving green
and blue cabs. Specifically:
Following a recent baseball game, a number of cars in the ballpark
parking lot were found to have had their windows smashed in.
1 STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE
310 (2d ed. 2014) ("Replication does not depend on assumptions about normality, sphericity,
or independence. Replication is not distorted by outliers. Replication is a cornerstone of
science. Replication is the best statistic.").
16 In total, 379 subjects were recruited using the same methods and procedures described
for the main experiment. See Part II, supra.
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At the game, 85% of the fans supported the green team and were
wearing green. Meanwhile 15% of the fans were supporting the
blue team and wearing blue. Only individuals with tickets had
access to the parking lot.
A witness, the parking lot attendant, reports that the person who
vandalized the cars was wearing blue. However, it was nighttime
when the vandalism occurred. The court tested the reliability of
the witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night
of the crime and concluded that the witness correctly identified
each one of the two colors 80% of the time and failed 20% of the
time.
The correct answer is 41%. When subjects were asked for the
probability that the perpetrator wore blue, most respondents answered 80%,
which represents the classic base rate fallacy result. Respondents focused
on the accuracy of the witness and did not account for the low base rate of
blue team fans. Intriguingly, however, when asked how surprised they
would be that the perpetrator wore green, the responses indicated that
significantly fewer people were susceptible to the base rate effect. Figure 5
presents histograms of the responses. While it is difficult to formally
compare the two distributions since the parameter is different, we note that
80% of the responses estimated a probability of greater than 50%, while only
57% of the responses provided a level of surprise greater than 50 out of 100.
FIGURE 5: HISTOGRAM OF RESPONSES FROM BASE RATE EXPERIMENT
'II
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While the dispersion associated with surprise(Green) may be
undesirable, these very preliminary results suggest that surprise may indeed
cause people to think about evidence differently, and may be a tool that the
legal system can harness to address base rate neglect.
V. CONCLUSION
Surprise offers an intriguing framework both for communicating the
burden of proof to jurors and for having the jurors think about the evidence
in a case. Our preliminary results show that surprise is a viable metric that
jurors can apply in meaningful and reasonably consistent ways. Yet, as one
might expect, our results raise more questions than they answer. Why is the
probability of innocence handled differently by mock jurors, so that its
estimate coheres with neither estimates of the probability of innocence nor
estimates of surprise? And can surprise offer a useful way to address base
rate neglect? Professor Risinger has certainly opened the door to some
interesting questions.
